|
Federalist Paper No. 13
Advantage of the Union
in Respect to Economy in Government
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety consider that
of economy. The money saved from one object may be usefully applied to another, and there
will be so much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are
united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they
are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil
lists to be provided for--and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive
with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire separation of
the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too
replete with danger to have many advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the
dismemberment of the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies--one
consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a third of the five
Southern States. There is little probability that there would be a greater number.
According to this distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory
larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will suppose that
the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly regulated by a government less
comprehensive in its organs or institutions than that which has been proposed by the
convention. When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the
same energy of government and the same forms of administration which are requisite in one
of much greater extent. This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no
rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary to the government of
any given number of individuals; but when we consider that the island of Britain, nearly
commensurate with each of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of
people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to direct the passions
of so large a society to the public good, we shall see no reason to doubt that the like
portion of power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more
numerous. Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of diffusing its force
to a very great extent; and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great
empire by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions.
The supposition that each confederacy into which the States would be likely to
be divided would require a government not less comprehensive than the one proposed, will
be strengthened by another supposition, more probable than that which presents us with
three confederacies as the alternative to a general Union. If we attend carefully to
geographical and commercial considerations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices
of the different States, we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will
most naturally league themselves under two governments. The four Eastern States, from all
the causes that form the links of national sympathy and connection, may with certainty be
expected to unite. New York, situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a
feeble and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are other obvious
reasons that would facilitate her accession to it. New Jersey is too small a State to
think of being a frontier, in opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor do
there appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even Pennsylvania would have
strong inducements to join the Northern league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis
of her own navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and
dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from various circumstances, may
not think themselves much interested in the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a
system which would give unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well as the
purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in
a connection so adverse to her policy. As she must at all events be a frontier, she may
deem it most consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned towards the weaker
power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the Northern,
Confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid being the Flanders of
America. Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy
includes New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to the south of
that State.
Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will be able to
support a national government better than one half, or one third, or any number less than
the whole. This reflection must have great weight in obviating that objection to the
proposed plan, which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection, however, which,
when we come to take a nearer view of it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken
ground.
If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, we take
into view the number of persons who must necessarily be employed to guard the inland
communication between the different confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time
will infallibly spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take into view
the military establishments which it has been shown would unavoidably result from the
jealousies and conflicts of the several nations into which the States would be divided, we
shall clearly discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the economy, than
to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of every part.
PUBLIUS.
(Continue to Page 14)
American Historical Documents | Educational Stuff Main | Home
|
