Federalist Paper No. 54
The Apportionment of Members Among the
States
From the New York Packet.
Tuesday, February 12, 1788.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives relates to the
appointment of its members to the several States which is to be determined by the same
rule with that of direct taxes.
It is not contended that the number of people in each State ought not to be the
standard for regulating the proportion of those who are to represent the people of each
State. The establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will probably be
as little contested; though the rule itself in this case, is by no means founded on the
same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights
of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has
reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in
ordinary cases a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule as
applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least
objectionable among the practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general
sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention.
All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from an
admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free
citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of
representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to
be comprehended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded
from representation which is regulated by a census of persons.
This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be
equally candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side.
"We subscribe to the doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren observe,
"that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more
immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of
our slaves. But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and
in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of
both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in
other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a
master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all
times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of
another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those
irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property.
In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against
the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in being
punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less
evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational
creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The federal Constitution,
therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in
the mixed character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character. It
is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be
denied, that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the
laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is disputed them
in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the
rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share
of representation with the other inhabitants.
"This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all sides,
that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as they are the only proper scale
of representation. Would the convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had
rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were
to be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to
be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur in a
system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men, when burdens were to be
imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light, when advantages were to be
conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the Southern
States with the barbarous policy of considering as property a part of their human
brethren, should themselves contend, that the government to which all the States are to be
parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of
property, than the very laws of which they complain?" It may be replied, perhaps,
that slaves are not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States
possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters.
Upon what principle, then, ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of
representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect,
have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide. "This
objection is repelled by a single abservation. It is a fundamental principle of the
proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the
several States is to be determined by a federal rule, founded on the aggregate number of
inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be
exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The
qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two
States. In some of the States the difference is very material. In every State, a certain
proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who
will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the
representatives. In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint, by
insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be
had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants; and consequently,
that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census according to
their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other
States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to
this principle, is waived by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that
equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as
it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be
mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the
equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the
MAN. "After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the
Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have hitherto proceeded on the
idea that representation related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a
just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the
persons, of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as
represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that
in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New York, one branch of the
government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly
elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government.
In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail. The rights of property are
committed into the same hands with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore,
to be paid to property in the choice of those hands. "For another reason, the votes
allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each State, ought to bear some
proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals, an
influence over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the law allows
an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and
consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes
of others to the objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights
of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State possesses no such
influence over other States. It is not probable that the richest State in the Confederacy
will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will the
representatives of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the federal
legislature, over the representatives of other States, than what may result from their
superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly
entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of
representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the
existing Confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar
confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions depends on
the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the
states, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence,
corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions.
Under the proposed Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the necessary
intervention of the individual States. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in
the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or
smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and
efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by
the representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality
of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the
difference in the personal character of the individual representative, rather than from
any regard to the extent of the district from which he comes. "Such is the reasoning
which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it
may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that
it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have
established. In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation and
taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by
the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree on the disposition, if not
on the co-operation, of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel
as little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their
share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in
exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a
contrary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will
have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the
requisite impartiality.
PUBLIUS.
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