Federalist Paper No. 62
The Senate
For the Independent Journal.
HAMILTON OR MADISON
To the People of the State of New York.
HAVING examined the constitution of the House of Representatives, and answered
such of the objections against it as seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the
examination of the Senate.
The heads into which this member of the government may be considered are: I.
The qualification of senators; II. The appointment of them by the State legislatures; III.
The equality of representation in the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the term for
which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the Senate.
I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished from those of
representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A
senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And
the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required for the
latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by the nature of the senatorial
trust, which, requiring greater extent of information and tability of character, requires
at the same time that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to
supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign
nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the
prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years
appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose
merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and
hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the
national councils.
II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the
State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting
this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention is probably
the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of
favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in
the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and
may form a convenient link between the two systems.
III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which,
being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and
the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a
people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a
PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and sovereign States,
bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an
EQUAL share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a
compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the government
ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal
representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the
Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a
spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our
political situation rendered indispensable.'' A common government, with powers equal to
its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the political situation,
of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger
States, is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for
the former, lies between the proposed government and a government still more
objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be to embrace the
lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs
which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the
sacrifice.
In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to each State is
at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the
equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they
are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper
consolidation of the States into one simple republic.
Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of the
Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation.
No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of
the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this
complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial;
and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be
more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other
States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger States will
always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this
prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of law-making seem to be
the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part
of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in
contemplation.
IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come next to
be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of these points, it will be
proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and in order to
ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must
suffer from the want of such an institution.
First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less
degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their
obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this
point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from,
and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the
government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two
distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of
one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles,
and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to
enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the improbability of sinister combinations
will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be
politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with
a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of republican
government.
Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of
all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and violent passions,
and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.
Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from proceedings within the
United States, as well as from the history of other nations. But a position that will not
be contradicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is to
correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and consequently ought to be less
numerous. It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold
its authority by a tenure of considerable duration.
Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a want of due
acquaintance with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an
assembly of men called for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in
appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of
public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of
their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors
in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that
no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders
of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of
most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending
laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient
wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session;
so many admonitions to the people, of the value of those aids which may be expected from a
well-constituted senate.
A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of
government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by
which that object can be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these
qualities; most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in
American governments too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal
Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the
last in a mode which increases the security for the first.
Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession
of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the
necessity of some stable institution in the government. Every new election in the States
is found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a
change of opinions; and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual
change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every
prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just, as
well as more important, in national transactions.
To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would fill a volume. I
will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innumerable
others.
In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of other nations,
and all the advantages connected with national character. An individual who is observed to
be inconstant to his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all, is
marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and
folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity him, but all will decline to connect their
fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out
of his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy
distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the
latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions
of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and
stability, may calculate on every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic
policy of their wiser neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily
conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no
respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to
every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and
embarrassed affairs.
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons
the blessing of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws
are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be
read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised
before they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what
the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of
action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed.
Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to
the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed
mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way
affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those
who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves,
but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of
things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the
MANY.
In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The
want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and
profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent
merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not but that
his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or
manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular
cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors
and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great
improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady
system of national policy.
But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and
reverence which steals into the hearts of the people, towards a political system which
betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No
government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly
respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and
stability.
PUBLIUS.
(Continue to Page 63)
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