In 2006, the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program is expected to
collect over $37 billion in taxes from employers to pay $34 billion in
benefits to unemployed workers. Under state UI programs, employers' tax
contributions are experience-rated--that is, they reflect the extent to
which they laid off workers who then collected benefits. To examine the
equity of this system, we met with officials from five states, reviewed
prior studies, and examined state data to determine (1) how states
ensure that employers pay UI taxes based on their experience with
unemployment, and the aspects of state unemployment insurance systems
that limit experience rating; (2) the extent to which employers pay
unemployment insurance taxes commensurate with unemployment benefits
paid to their former employees; and how this varies by industry; and
(3) steps states could take to increase the degree of experience
rating. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Labor
(Labor) for its review. Overall, Labor agreed with our findings.
All state Unemployment Insurance-financing systems are experience-rated,
but several aspects of these systems limit the connection between an
employer's tax contributions and the employer's experience with
unemployment. For example, a state's maximum tax rate limits the size
of an employer's tax payment, regardless of the costs an employer may
have imposed on the system. Similarly, a minimum tax rate ensures that
an employer's tax rate will not drop below a specified floor, no matter
how much its experience rating improves. Other aspects of state systems
allow the cost of some benefits to be charged to all employers rather
than to a single employer. These shared costs include, for example,
benefits paid to unemployed workers of a firm that has gone out of
business. When the cost of benefits is shared in this way, it reduces
experience rating and imposes additional costs on all employers. A
series of studies that examine experience rating in state UI systems
show that a number of industries used more in benefits than they paid
in taxes to finance the system. Certain industries, such as
construction and agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, as a whole,
consistently received such subsidies, while other industries, such as
finance, insurance, and real estate tended to pay subsidies. Newer
firms that are not yet experience-rated, regardless of industry, also
tend to pay subsidies. Our analysis of more recent data from three
states found a similar pattern of subsidies. States could increase
experience rating and reduce subsidies by adjusting aspects of the
unemployment insurance tax structure, such as the maximum tax rate.
However, each of these adjustments has trade-offs that would have to be
considered by a state because the adjustments would raise costs for
some employers or reduce costs for others. In addition, such
adjustments would have to be evaluated based on the implications for
other policy objectives established for a state's unemployment
insurance program.
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