Mr. Chairman and respective members of the Senate Finance Committee,
it is a pleasure to be able to address you here today. I have been a
law enforcement officer for approximately twenty years. Currently, I
am a criminal investigator for the Internal Revenue Service's
Internal Security Division.
IRS' Internal Security Division has a multi-functional purpose. In
the broad sense we have a mission similar to that of a Federal
Inspector General or internal affairs in a police department, along
with some additional duties. Among our main responsibilities are
conducting investigations into allegations of IRS employee
misconduct, outside attempts to corrupt the administration of
internal revenue laws, and employee safety
I am here to speak about some of the problems I have observed in
performing my work for the Internal Security Division. By the nature
of our mission, it is imperative that we be unencumbered in opening
and investigating violations of law within the scope of our office.
However, the culture and climate of the Internal Revenue Service
often prevents internal Security from fulfilling our
responsibilities. In addition, the distrustful and secretive nature
often hinders an investigation.
A lack of independence from District and regional forces intent on
not tarnishing the IRS' image has reduced administrative sanctions
against employees to a point where they have no effect in
controlling employee misconduct. IRS does not want bad press on
employee misconduct at a we when the Agency's public image is at a
low point. This has affected who we investigate and what happens
after an investigation has been completed.
Allegations against Internal Revenue Service managers and National
Treasury Employee Union (NTEU) officials have not been investigated.
The IRS is aware of the administration's favorable view of unions.
NTEU greatly benefits from this. High level Internal Security
officials do not want to talk on a case involving the union or union
officials.
Allegations against IRS managers, including Criminal investigation
Division managers are only worked when an allegation is serious and
Internal Security management can not find a way out of assigning the
case (ie: too many people are aware of an allegation). Some Internal
Security managers believe that there is a bond between all IRS
managers that should be maintained in the name of working relations.
There have been violations concerning the taxpayer's Attorney/Client
privilege. IRS management often knows of these violations for months
before reporting them to Internal Security. These types of cases can
involve compromises in privileged communications.
Investigations into serious allegations are shortened by nature of a
180 day baseline. Six months is insufficient time to conduct a
complex investigation, especially when new allegations are developed
during the investigation. After 180 days the investigator and the
immediate manager start to feel pressure on closing the case. This
is where the IRS "bean counter" mentality hurts us. An employee case
is considered an "actionable" case. This means proven or not,
opening the case earns the agent credit for what we call a "stat." A
case not involving an employee only gets a "stat" if there is
judicial action. In other words, hypothetically, a case involving an
armed militia is of less credit for the Inspection Division than a
case involving the misuse of a government car by an IRS employee.
Management feels that since a "stat" is obtained just by opening any
employee case, there is no justification to have any case older than
180 days.
Proven violations of criminal misconduct against an employee have
been "whitewashed" by Internal Revenue Service managers and labor
relations. Serious violations such as browsing, unauthorized access
to taxpayer's records, and unauthorized release of taxpayer's
information have received nothing more than counseling letters.
These letters are then removed from the employee's personnel file
after one year. This kind of action does not serve as a deterrent
for misconduct.
The IRS can, and does, investigate its own employees when it is
suspected that an employee has acted improperly or illegally.
However, Internal Security management has inappropriately notified
and kept IRS District management officials abreast of these
investigations. Such investigations are supposed to be kept
confidential. However, more often than not, if these investigations
target employees who are friends of management, they will be
informed of the probe in time to quit the agency before adverse
personnel action can be initiated against them. Once an IRS employee
resigns, it is rare that the U.S. Attorney will accept that case for
prosecution.
At the same time there is outside interference on Internal
Security's mission, there are internal pressures that corrupt our
ethical standards and place morale at low levels.
Internal Security managers exhibit arrogance while they themselves
violate laws and commit prohibited personnel practices.
Investigators have been told by Internal Security managers to record
the conversations of other IRS employees without the Attorney
General's approval. In other words, we have been directed to make
non-consensual recordings of other IRS employees without fulfilling
Justice Department requirements.
Investigators are often not able to share taxpayer information on
multi-agency investigations, yet Internal Security managers have
"unofficially" provided taxpayer information to managers at other
agencies.
IRS Internal Security managers are notorious for committing
prohibited personnel practices. After an employee litigates, settles
out of court or obtains a favorable Merit Systems Protection Board
ruling (MSPB), the Agency takes the corrective action without
consequence to the offending manager. In other words, a manager
violates an employee's rights. The employee seeks and obtains
redress from the Agency, but the manager is never sanctioned for
violating the employee's rights in the first place.
Internal Security managers are aware of how difficult it is for an
employee to litigate against the Agency. After all, the Agency does
not have to pay for legal representation. If a manager does not like
an employee for personal reasons, there is nothing to stop the
manger from violating the employee's rights. This is a "us" vs.
"them" mentality that is more flagrant at this Agency than I've ever
seen anywhere else.
The "corporate culture" at 1111 Constitution Avenue is not conducive
towards independent, well worked criminal investigations. In
general, IRS pushes employees to open and close a tax or collection
matter as quickly as they can. Often getting the proper tax is
secondary to reducing overall case load as quickly as possible.
For Internal Security this "bean counter" mentality means numbers,
numbers, numbers! "Cases open, cases closed - let's count them up so
we can report at the end of the year what a good job we've done!"
Quality, where is that found in an accountant's book?
In a way, this has created an atmosphere that has given us many of
our employee misconduct cases. However, criminal law does not afford
us the opportunity to work an investigation in the same manner. As
long as Internal Security is part of the IRS, there can be no real
oversight or independence; we are just part of a greater problem.
Over my 20 years of service, I have become painfully aware of the
ability of the IRS to retaliate against employees who dare to speak
out. Many of the witnesses you will have before you in this hearing
could be retaliated against for their testimony before this
Committee. At times, I have been assigned an employee case and been
told that management does not like that employee, and I have been
told that I need to find something that they can use to terminate
their employment. In the IRS, retaliation is swift and severe. I
hope you will respect the risk that these witnesses took to appear
before you, and protect them from any act of revenge by IRS
management.
I came here, today, not to harm this Agency, but to help it heal.
You must decide the best method to accomplish that goal. The IRS
cannot heal itself, so others and I have taken the chance that you
are serious about changing and improving my Agency. I thank you for
the opportunity to participate in that healing process.